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Enactment  of  federal  farm  commodity  legisla-
tion has  been an issue which has greatly concerned
agricultural  economists.  This  interest  concerns
both  the  impact  of  government  policy  on  the
production  and  distribution  of agricultural  com-
modities  and  actual  and  potential  changes  in
program  structure  and benefit levels  which change
the  policy  constraints in the agricultural economy.
Structural  changes  in  U.S.  political  processes-
reduction  in  farm  population  and  the  emergence
of two  party competition in rural  areas-have  been
extensively  related  to  the  ongoing  evolution  of
agricultural  policy.  However,  most  of  this  litera-
ture  lacks  conceptual  and,  particularly,  empirical
content.  Significant  exceptions  concern  single
commodities  which  abstracts  from  the  notable
feature  of  multi-commodity  farm  legislation
[Field,  Rausser and Freebairn].
This paper  reports  on  a preliminary  analysis  of
the  factors  affecting  support  for  agricultural
legislation  in  Congress.  The  theory  of  public
choice  is  ultilized  as  a conceptual  framework  for
an  analysis  of  the  Agriculture  Act  Amendments
in  1975  which  were  designed  to  raise  target
prices  and  support  levels  for  a  number  of  com-
modities.  Although  the  legislation  was  initially
passed  by  both  the  House  of  Representatives
and  the  Senate,  the President's  veto  was sustained
when  the  House  was  unable  to  produce  a  two-
thirds majority. The empirical  analysis forcused  on
estimation  of discriminant  functions  of the Senate
vote  on  passage  of this  bill.  While  it is  recognized
that  issues  of  agricultural  legislation  are  more
divisive  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  the
smaller  numbers  of  Senators  and  their  repre-
sentation  of  states  simplifies  empirical  analysis.
This  analysis  provides  methodological  and  sub-
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stantive  insights which  would  be  useful in analysis
of House votes.
Analytical  Framework
The  theory  of  public  choice  conceptualizes
political  decisions  in  a  benefit-cost  framework.
Citizens  are  postulated  to  cast  their  votes  in
elections  on  the  basis  of  an individual  evaluation
of  the  costs  and  benefits  of  the  set  of  public
policies  to  which  alternative  candidates  are  com-
mitted.  In  their  votes  in  Congress,  politicians
vote  in  a  manner  which  satisfies  a  majority  of
their  constituents.  Cochrane  and  Hardin  have
implicitly  used such a model in predicting declining
support  for  farm  programs.  Benefits  from  agri-
cultural  programs  designed  to  raise  farm  prices
are  concentrated  among  farmers  and  in  farm
producing  regions.  Costs  of  programs,  which  are
reflected  in  government  outlays  and  rising  food
prices,  are  widely  dispersed  among  all  taxpayers
and  consumers.  With  a  small  farm  population,
farmers  are  a  miniscule  minority  in  most  con-
stituencies  so  that  very  few  legislators  would
be  expected  to  support  farm  legislation.  How-
ever,  this  naive  model  fails  to  explain  continued
affirmative action on farm legislation.
The  concept  of  rational  ignorance  [Downs]
adds  more  realism  to  the  naive  model.  Rational
ignorance  suggests  that  voters  are  unaware  and/or
indifferent  of the  positions  of their legislators  on
issues  of  minor  significance  to  their  economic
welfare.  Under  this  viewpoint,  a  politician  could
support  farm  legislation  which  benefited  a small
minority  of his  constituents.  Supporting  positions
favored by  a  minority of a constituency is especially
likely  as  long  as  the  issues  involved  are  narrowly
defined  and  attract  little  public  attention.  For
agricultural  legislation,  opposition  would  be
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heightened  in  a  non-agricultural  constituency  if
government  costs  are  high  and/or  the  program
greatly  increases  food costs. Empirical relevance  of
this proposition  is supported in the high and visible
costs associated  with the payments limitation issue
and more  currently the peanut program.
The  concept  of log-rolling increases  the propen-
sity  of a legislator  to vote for legislation not bene-
ficial  to a majority of his constituents. As conceived
by Buchanan and Tullock, legislators support issues
of low priority to  their constituents in  order to win
support on issues of higher priority. The electorate,
in  turn,  ignores  their  interests  on  issues  of lower
priority  if  the  politician  supports  their  major  in-
terests.  For  an  issue  with  large  benefits  to  a  small
constituency,  the potential  for log-rolling is higher
than  if benefits  are  small.  Bonnen, Hathaway,  and
Wyckoff  have  utilized  log-rolling  concepts  in  ex-
amining potential  support for farm legislation.
Consideration  of  rational  ignorance  and  log-
rolling gives  the public choice model unity with the
political concept of pluralism  [Steiner].  In general,
this  theory  suggests  two  reasons  why  a  politician
would  be  expected  to  support  farm  legislation:
1) the legislation  provides significant'benefits  to an
important organized component of his constituency
without  providing  significant  costs  to other  com-
ponents and  2) the  vote reflects log-rolling activity.
In  terms  of  causality,  the  larger  the  potential
benefits  and/or number of beneficiaries  the greater
the  likelihood of support  for farm legislation.  Gen-
eralities  concerning log-rolling are not as easy to de-
rive.  One  exception  is  that  Democratic  legislators
could  be  expected  to  be  more  likely  to  support
farm  legislation  because  of the  historical  commit-
ment to farm programs.
Empirical Model
The  analytical  framework  discussed  in  the pre-
vious section was applied to an analysis of the votes
of  Senators  on  the  1975  farm  bill.  Discriminant
functions  were  estimated  for positive  and negative
votes  on  final  passage  of  the  bill.  Classification
variables  in  the  functions  reflected  the  political
forces  suggested  in  the  theoretical  discussion.
Variables  which  were  included  in the  analysis  and
data sources  are indicated in table  1.
A  component  of the variables  reflected  the im-
portance  of farm  interests in each state. Percentage
of constituency  residing  in urban areas  reflects the
proportion  of  the  citizenry  which  would  be  un-
connected  with agriculture  and would be expected
to be  associated  with negative votes on farm  legis-
lation.  Variables  on  the  percent  of state  farm  in-
come  derived  from  a  particular  commodity  were
included  for  all  commodities  represented  in  the
legislation.  Unless  these  commodity  interests  re-
flected  a  large  percentage  of state  farm  income,
senators  were  expected  to oppose  the  legislation.
The  influence  of  commodity  income  on  the
senators' support  was expected to vary among com-
modities.  The  features  of the bill were  most favor-
able  for  dairy,  feed  grains,  wheat,  and  cotton:
milk support prices were continued at 80% of parity
Table  1. Description of variables  used in analysis
Variable  Units
Senate votesa
Democratic partyb  1 for Democrats;  0 otherwise
Urban  populationc  Urban  as a percentage of total  population
Farm  Bureau  membership  Membership  as a percentage of farmers
Western  cattle statese  1 for Western  states with  50% of gross farm  income  from cattle
Beef  cowse  Head  in  thousands
College educationc  Percentage of state population  (25 and older)  with college  education
Feed grains  incomee  Percentage of state gross farm  income
Cotton  incomee  Percentage of state gross farm  income
Tobacco incomee  Percentage of state gross farm  income
Soybeans incomee  Percentage of state gross farm  income
Wheat  incomee  Percentage of state gross farm  income
Dairy  incomee  Percentage of state gross  farm  income
Sources:  aCongressional Quarterly Weekly  Report,  Vol.  33, March  29,  1975,  p. 673.
bCongressional  Directory, 94th  Congress  First Session,  1975, Government Printing Office, Washington,  D.C.
cU.S.  Bureau  of  the  Census,  U.S.  Census of Population:  1970,  Vol.  1, Parts  A  and  C, Government Printing
Office, Washington,  D.C.
dTalbot,  Ross B. and  Don  F. Hadwiger,  The Policy Process in American Agriculture,  Chandler  Publishing Com-
pany, San  Francisco.  1965.
eU.S.  Department  of Agriculture,Agricultural Statistics  1975, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
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and  both target  prices and price  support loan rates
were  raised  for the  three  crops.  For soybeans  and
tobacco,  the  provisions  only  concerned  price-
support  loan  rates  which  provide  very little  price
protection  under  current  farm  policy  and  would
be expected  to have little influence  on support.
Two  variables  were  included  to  reflect  con-
stituent  interest  in  beef  cattle.  Even  though  beef
incomes  are  not  directly  supported  in  the  provi-
sions  of the  bill,  the  price  of beef is related to the
supply  of feed  grains. After the recent experiences
with  low  beef  prices,  beef  producers  could  be
interested  in  the  incentives  for  grain  production
provided  by the target  prices. Number of beef cows
would  reflect  the  importance  of  feeder  calf  pro-
duction  and  the  Western  beef  dummy  variable
isolates  the  influence  of  specialization  in  beef
production  in  several  Western  States.  It  can  be
noted  that  the  existence  of support  of beef  pro-
ducers  for  feed  grains  programs  is  the  reverse  of
historical  patterns  of  political  position  on  feed
grains programs  [Hadwiger and Talbot].
The variables representing Farm Bureau member-
ship,  college  education,  and  political  party  were
included  to  measure  both  effect  of  farm  income
support  and  log-rolling.  Considering  the historical
opposition  of the  American  Farm  Bureau  Federa-
tion  to  commodity  programs, senators with a large
Farm  Bureau  membership  in  their  constituency
would  be  expected  to  ignore  their  constituents'
farm  interests  and/or  less likely to log-roll on farm
bills.  College  education  would  be  expected  to  in-
crease  constituent  awareness  of the  costs  of farm
legislation  and  perhaps  involvement  in  the  con-
sumer movement; these influences  would be ex-
pected  to increase  opposition  to farm  legislation.
Finally,  Democrats  would  be  expected  to be more
likely  to support farm bills than  Republicans; they
would  be  more  likely  to  include  farmers  in  their
coalition  of support  and  also to  log-roll with their
rural  colleagues  in  Congress.  To measure  the  par-
ticular  influence  of political  party,  one  model  ex-
cluded party from the set of classification  variables
and another included party  as a dummy variable.
One  short-coming of this  empirical  approach  is
the  equivalence  of  the  set  of  classification  vari-
ables  for  senators  from  states  in  which  both  are
members  of  the  same  party.  If the  senators  take
different  positions  on  a  vote,  this  equivalence
means  that  the  discriminant  functions  will  mis-
classify  one  of the  Senators.  In this analysis,  three
states-Florida,  Tennessee,  and West Virginia-were
subject to this problem.
Analysis  of Votes
The  results  of the  discriminant  analysis-the  co-
efficients  or weights for  each variable  in each linear
function  in  both  models  are  shown in table 2. The
F-statistic  for each  coefficient  is also included.  In-
terpretation  of the  results  for each  individual  vari-
able  is based on  its statistical  significance  and  the
relative  magnitudes  of the coefficients.  The largest
coefficient  for a variable  indicates  in  which  group
a  senator  would  be  classified  if  the  value  of the
functions  without  the  effect  of the  variable  were
equal.  The  results  for  the  set  of  farm  variables
Table  2.  Discriminant functions which  classify senators  according to votes on  1975 general  farm  bill
Model  I  Model  II
Coefficients  Coefficients
Voted  Voted  Voted  Voted
Variable  Yes  No  F-Value  Yes  No  F-Value
Constant  -28.0629  -36.1121  -32.9862  -37.8071
Democratic  party  7.6582  4.4935  14.9185***
Urban  population  0.3252  0.4172  8.3562***  0.3213  0.4149  7.0353***
Farm  Bureau  membership  0.0268  0.0428  2.1874  0.0182  0.0378  2.6883
Western  cattle states  -2.9230  -6.4472  6.4985**  -0.6486  -5.1126  8.5875* *
Beef  cows  0.0005  -0.0001  3.8227*  0.0005  -0.0002  2.9091*
College education  2.4782  2.9083  3.3544*  2.5114  2.9278  2.5690
Feed grains  income  -0.0229  -0.0981  2.5121  0.1220  -0.0131  6.3657**
Cotton  income  1.8422  1.2394  0.9846  3.4653  2.1918  3.4675*
Tobacco income  0.5262  0.5320  0.0075  0.6771  0.6205  0.5719
Soybeans income  0.4359  0.3584  1.5342  0.3694  0.3194  0.5146
Wheat  income  0.3045  0.1855  6.7891**  0.4695  0.2823  13.1558***
Dairy  income  0.2259  0.1709  2.7773*  0.3004  0.2147  5.4662**
*.10  level of significance
**.05  level  of significance
***.01  level  of significance
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were  as expected.  The six commodities  included  in
the  legislation  were  all  associated  with affirmative
votes  with the  exception  of tobacco in Model  I. In
addition,  the  significance  levels  correspond  with
expected  associations-tobacco  and soybeans  were
non-significant  in  both  models,  dairy  and  wheat
were  significant  in  both  models  and  feed  grains
and cotton in Model  II. In addition, the coefficients
on  the  beef variables  and the urban variable  were
significant  in  both  models  and  correspond  to the
theoretical analysis.
The  results  of the  set  of  variables included  to
measure  both  the  propensity  to  log-roll  and  farm
income  effects  were  not as  satisfactory.  In Model
II,  the  Democratic  Party  membership  was  asso-
ciated  with  positive  votes  and  was  highly  signifi-
cant.  Farm  Bureau  membership  and  college
education  were  associated  with  negative  votes  in
both  models  but  only  college  education  was  sig-
nificant  in Model  I and neither  in Model II.
In  general,  Model  II  appears  to  be  superior.
Not  only  was  the  coefficient  for  political  party
significant but also  the coefficients  for feed grains
and  cotton  income  were  significant  when  party
was  included.  An analysis  of the  incorrect classifi-
cation  of  Senators  is  also  consistent  with  this
view-thirteen  were  incorrectly  classified  in Model
I and  seven  in Model  II. While improved  classifica-
tion  would  be  expected  with  the  addition  of  an
addititional  variable,  Model  I  appeared  to have  a
specification  bias:  nine  out  of the thirteen  incor-
rect  classifications  were  from  the  West in Model  I
compared  to  two  out  of seven  in  Model  II.  More
importantly,  six  Democrats  from  the  West  were
incorrectly  classified  as  voting  no  and  three
Republicans  were  incorrectly  classified  as  voting
yes  in  Model  I.  Thus,  Model  II  is  clearly  an  im-
proved specification  for the West.
Conclusions  and Implications
The  emprical  analysis  of  Senate  votes  on  the
1975  farm  bill  supported  the  use  of the  theory
of  public  choice  as  a  framework  for  empirical
analysis  of  agricultural  policy.  The  existence  of
primary  benefits from  farm programs were  demon-
strated  to  be  associated  with  support  of the  bill;
furthermore,  the  commodities  with  more  benefits
had  statistically  significant  associations  while
those  with  less  potential  benefits  were  not  sig-
nificant.  The  analysis  of log-rolling  on farm legisla-
tion,  other than  through  political  parties,  was  not
as  satisfactory.  However,  political  party  was
demonstrated  to  be  particularly  important  in
classifying  votes  of Western  senators.  Of substan-
tive interest, the analysis indicated that beef produc-
tion  in general  and in the West in particular is now
associated  with  support  of  feed  grains  programs
which  is a reversal  of historical patterns.
The  analysis  in  this  paper  has  several  implica-
tions  for  future  research  on  agricultural  policy.
Past  research  that  has  related  support  for  farm
programs  solely  to  farm  population  in  a  consti-
tuency  has  failed  to  consider  the  importance  of
the  income  of  commodities  covered  by  the  legis-
lation. In  addition, political party is a reliable  mea-
sure  of  propensity  to log-roll  for farm  legislation,
at least in the  Senate. Finally,  discriminant analysis
has fairly strong probability assumptions, and linear
probability  models could be  considered as an alter-
native statistical model for this analysis [Ladd]  .
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